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inflation and output today. That is, the
FOMC can either change the current
funds rate or draft language in the policy
statement that is meant to influence
expectations about future changes in the
funds rate, or both. 
But how do anticipations of future policy
influence what happens today? For one,
longer-term rates are heavily dependent
on the future course of shorter-term rates.
For example, the interest rate on a two-
year loan is closely linked to the four 
six-month interest rates that are expected
to arise over these two years. Secondly,
household consumption and business-
investment decisions are influenced by
longer-term interest rates such as one-
year commercial loans, four-year car
loans, and fifteen-year mortgages. 
The federal funds rate is a very short-term
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There has been a remarkable
increase in FOMC communication
over the last decade. Perhaps the
most dramatic change was the 
inclusion of language indicating the
possible direction of future policy.
One example is the now famous 
“considerable-period” language that
was inserted in August 2003. This 
forward-looking language was
remarkable in that it seemingly 
signaled the Committee’s intention to
keep rates low for an extended
period. This Commentary analyzes
the reasons behind the “considerable-
period-of-time” language, and it
argues that such language was impor-
tant to stem further declines in infla-
tion since the funds rate was already
close to its lower bound of zero.
During Alan Greenspan’s tenure, the
increase in the communication and
transparency of FOMC decisions has
been remarkable. Prior to 1994, the
FOMC did not even announce its target
for the federal funds rate, leaving mar-
kets to infer it from subsequent open
market operations. Yet since February
1994, the FOMC has issued a statement
after each meeting indicating the funds
rate target decided upon during that
meeting. In December 1998, the FOMC
also began to include in its statement the 
current “bias,” indicating possible
behavior of future policy. In December
1999, this forward-looking behavior was 
modified to include a “balance of risk”
assessment. This forward-looking policy
statement was then amplified after the
August 2003 meeting in which the
FOMC introduced the now famous
“considerable-period” language, stating
that “the Committee believes that policy
accommodation can be maintained for a
considerable period.” In January 2004,
this outlook was weakened slightly
when the FOMC stated that “the Com-
mittee believes that it can be patient in
removing its policy accommodation.”
Finally, in June 2004, the language was
again modified to indicate that the
FOMC would start increasing rates, but
that this policy accommodation would
be removed at a “measured pace.”
This Commentary looks at one possible
rationale for forward-looking language
in FOMC communications. In particu-
lar, we analyze advantages of the 
“considerable-period-of-time” language
and suggest why the FOMC may have
decided to introduce this statement after
the August 2003 meeting. 
■ Deflation and the Zero 
Nominal Interest Rate Bound 
One troubling development in the eco-
nomic environment around the time the
considerable-period language was intro-
duced was the possibility of deflation
(negative inflation rates). Figure 1 shows
that inflation had fallen from 3 percent at
the beginning of 2001 to nearly 1 percent
by mid-2003. There was a general con-
cern that if the inflation trend continued
there could be deflation. Although the
probability of an actual deflation was 
considered small, many were concerned
that the costs of deflation were potentially
large. Figure 1 also shows that the Com-
mittee responded by continually decreas-
ing the funds rate through the meeting on
June 25, 2003, at which point the funds
rate had dropped to an unprecedented 
1 percent. 
The possibility of deflation remained,
but since nominal rates cannot fall below
zero, there was the added concern that
little additional monetary stimulus was
available if the FOMC needed it. In
other words, a 1 percent funds rate is
only a few policy moves away from
zero. Because of this limited downward
maneuverability, there was a reluctance
to decrease the funds rate any further.
But even if the current funds rate is kept
constant, there is another policy tool at
the FOMC’s disposal: the ability to
influence market expectations of future
policy movements.
■ Signaling the Future to
Influence Today 
Policymakers have limited tools with
which they can influence inflation and
output. The most obvious tool is the cur-
rent federal funds rate. But there is
another tool: anticipated future move-
ments in the funds rate, which affectIt is important to emphasize the need for cen-
tral-bank credibility for such a policy
announcement to work. The central bank can
influence market anticipations of future cen-
tral-bank policy only if it usually follows
through on its announcements. If the FOMC’s
actual policy behavior systematically deviates
from previous policy announcements, then the
central bank will lose its ability to influence
expectations. But there is a cost to such 
credibility. If the FOMC can deliver better
outcomes in the fall of 2003 by announcing
policy moves for the spring of 2004, then the
cost of such an announcement comes due in
the spring of 2004 when these previous
announcements must be fulfilled. Of course,
such announcements are not firm promises
but more likely a portrayal of the intentions 
of the Committee if the economy unfolds 
as expected. 
■ A Quantitative Analysis
The remainder of this Commentary will use a
model to quantitatively examine the size of
these announcement effects. The previous 
discussion suggests that announcing a sustained
accommodative policy is more stimulative than
an accommodative policy that is not announced.
But how large are these differences? 
The exercise that follows is meant to loosely
mimic the economy during the summer of
2003. We assume that the economy experi-
ences a series of demand disturbances that
lower both inflation and output. The exact
nature of this shock is not important, but such
a shock would give the central bank a ratio-
nale for stimulating the economy. Without
these shocks, we assume that the long-run
inflation target is 1.5 percent, and the long-run
nominal funds rate is set at 3.3 percent. 
We examine three policy scenarios. In the
first, we assume that the central bank conducts
policy according to a standard Taylor rule that
posits that the funds rate should increase
whenever inflation and output increase, and it
should decrease if both decrease. If one goes
up and the other goes down, the response of
the federal funds rate should depend on the
relative strength of each. Figure 2 graphs the
behavior of the actual real funds rate and the
funds rate that is predicted by the Taylor rule.
For the purposes of this Commentary, we will
treat the funds rate predicted by the Taylor
rule as neutral and consider reductions from it
as accommodative policy. 
In 1993, John Taylor proposed that the behav-
ior of the funds rate since 1986 can reasonably
be described by a relatively simple formula,
now known as the Taylor rule. The rule
assumes that the central bank increases the
federal funds rate when the inflation rate or
output growth or both are larger than the cen-
tral bank’s target range. A neutral funds rate is
difficult to estimate since it should change with
economic conditions. In our theoretical model,
we treat the federal funds rate suggested by the
Taylor rule as neutral.
rate, an overnight rate. But if the FOMC
can signal its intentions to maintain a
funds-rate reduction for a long, or 
“considerable,” period of time, such a
signal of future short-term rates will lead
to a reduction in longer-term rates. This
reduction in longer-term rates will stimu-
late output and also increase inflation.
■ August 2003 and the Need
for Credibility
Let us use the preceding analysis to think
about the FOMC’s decisionmaking in
August 2003. Recall that (1) the funds
rate was at 1 percent, a level that left 
little downward maneuverability, and 
(2) many feared the possibility of a 
deflation. How is a deflation to be
avoided if the current funds rate is not
an available tool? The FOMC could
put downward pressure on longer-term
rates by signaling its intention of keep-
ing the short-term rate (the federal
funds rate) low for a considerable
period of time. If such a signal was
believed, this policy announcement
would be stimulative today and thus
ward off the potential deflation.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,”
H.15, Federal Reserve Statistical Releases. The formula for the Taylor rule is from Sharon
Kozicki, “How Useful Are Taylor Rules for Monetary Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Economic Review, 1999:IIQ. 
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15, Federal 
Statistical Releases.gap between the inflation rate in the
anticipated-versus-unanticipated experi-
ment peaks in excess of 0.4 percent.
While both the anticipated and the unan-
ticipated accommodation do increase
output compared to the baseline Taylor
rule, the effect is four times larger when
the accommodation is anticipated. 
When a policy change is anticipated,  two
effects occur. First, any impact, since it is
anticipated, is moved forward in time.
Thus, inflation increases immediately
because interest rates are expected to 
be lower in the future. This immediate
increase in inflation also feeds into out-
put. But making the policy anticipated
does more than just move the eventual
impact forward; it magnifies these effects
as well. Inflation remains substantially
higher when the policy change is antici-
pated than it does when it is unantici-
pated. These results demonstrate the
advantage of announced accommodation.
a. Simulations for the anticipated and unanticipated experiments are the model's responses to policy being kept 175 basis points below the Taylor
rule for six quarters. Author's simulations.
b. Anticipated implies that the public understands and anticipates that monetary policy will deviate from the Taylor rule for six quarters.
c. Unanticipated implies that the public believes that monetary policy will be conducted according to a Taylor rule, but instead the funds rate is
unexpectedly kept below the Taylor rule.
d. The formula for the Taylor rule is from Sharon Kozicki, “How Useful Are Taylor Rules for Monetary Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Economic Review, 1999:IIQ. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15, Federal Reserve Statistical Releases.
FIGURE 3 SIMULATING THE IMPACT OF A PERSISTENT FUNDS RATE CUT
In the second policy scenario, the central
bank is accommodative, lowering the
funds rate 175 basis points below the
Taylor rule prescription. This accommo-
dation is assumed to be in place for six
quarters, our version of a “considerable
period” of time. In this scenario, we
assume that the Committee issues a
statement indicating that this “policy
accommodation can be maintained for a
considerable period,” and it is sufficient
to condition expectations so that market
participants fully anticipate this future
path of the funds rate. 
In the third policy scenario, this six-
quarter accommodation occurs but is not
anticipated. This is meant to crudely
mimic what would have happened if the
FOMC had followed the same path for
interest rates as it did in the second 
scenario, but market participants instead
anticipated that the accommodation
would not last and that the funds rate
would return to the Taylor rule prescrip-
tion in the next period. This is our
attempt to indicate how effective policy
might have been if forward-looking 
language had not been issued by the
FOMC. The key question is whether 
output and inflation react more in
response to a series of anticipated or
unanticipated funds-rate movements. 
Figure 3 shows the results of these 
experiments. The output and inflation-
ary consequences are much stronger
when the policy accommodation is
anticipated compared to when it is
unanticipated. Because of the demand
shock, the baseline Taylor rule has
inflation declining to less than 1 per-
cent (recall that the long-run level is 
1.5 percent). When the accommodative
policy is unanticipated, inflation barely
increases above this path. But when the
policy is anticipated, the initial decline
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By signaling a persistent decline in the
funds rate below the Taylor rule level, the
central bank is able to avoid a larger drop
in inflation and output than would arise
under either a Taylor rule with no accom-
modation or an unanticipated accommo-
dation from the rule.
The stimulative impact of the antici-
pated accommodation can be seen in at
least two ways: the long-term interest
rate and money growth. Figure 3 shows
the behavior of the two-year nominal
interest rate under the three policy 
scenarios. In the baseline Taylor rule,
this long-term rate falls from its steady
state of 3.3 percent to 1.9 percent. When
the 175 basis point policy accommoda-
tion is unanticipated, this rate falls a 
bit further to 1.7 percent. But we get 
the largest impact on the long-term rate
when policy accommodation is antici-
pated: the long-term rate falls to 1.4 
percent. This larger decline in the long-
term rate leads to more stimulus to 
inflation and output.
The initial money-growth rate necessary
to achieve the interest rate target is much
different in the two experiments. Money
growth is positive when accommodation
is anticipated and negative when it is 
not. This is because the larger output
response for a given quantity of nominal
money puts upward pressure on the real
interest rate when the policy accommo-
dation is anticipated. Therefore, to push
the nominal and real rates down, the
money supply has to respond sharply
when the policy change is expected to
remain in effect for six quarters. In the
unanticipated experiment, output actually
declines (because of the negative demand
shock) so that the central bank must con-
tract the money supply to achieve the
interest rate target.
■ Conclusions 
Perhaps one of the most dramatic
changes during Greenspan’s tenure 
as chairman was the clear indication
about future policy intentions. The
“considerable-period-of-time” language
starting with the August 2003 meeting 
is the most stark example of the 
Committee deciding to signal these
intentions. Given that interest rates
could not be reduced much more
because of the inability of nominal
interest rates to fall below zero, such
forward-looking language was impor-
tant to stem the decline in inflation.





Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted if the source is
credited. Please send copies of reprinted
material to the editor.